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PROOF OF FOREIGN LAW.
The decision in Bock vs. Lauman, 12 Harris, 45, that thc court
will ascertain and apply foreign law to a case which is governe 1 by
it, without the aid of a jury, is worthy of some notice. It is
beliqved that it has been the uniform practice to consider a re of
foreign law a matter-of fact, to be ascertained as all other facts in
pais are ascertained, and if this is to continue, it matters very F;ttle
whether the tribunal to pass upon the question be the judge or the
jury. But if the judge is to determine, the next inquiry must be,
how is he to ascertain the fact ? Our system makes no provisIor for
the only mode by which this can be done, that is, by the testi ony
of experts. For how are the jury to give their verdict ? ,u -t
they wait until the judge has determined his branch of the fact:,
and if not, when are the two verdicts to be moulded into one, at. I
what is the remedy for an error in fact, in this respect; a mrteon
for a new trial or a writ of error, and who is to be responsible fo..
a false verdict? Are the judges, or the authors from whom it'
derive their information, to be liable for perjury, if they mis-s'.te
the fact ? or is evidence to be received without any sanction for its
truth? Bu~. perhaps there is another reason for the old ruie.
It being confessedly a matter of fact, and to be ascertained by
evidence; if the plan adopted in Bock vs. Lauman, is to be f-Jlowed, it is obvious that a man's rights must be decided upon pro..
the existence of which he is ignorant of, and which, if presented,
may have the most abundant means of showing are uhworthy

PROOF OF FOREIGN LAW.

credit: It has always been supposed, that the submitting evidence
to the discussions of counsel before their effect is determined upon,
and the right to know what is the evidence upon whieh one's rights
are to be adjudged, with an opportunity to discuss it, are among
the best methods of arriving at the truth; neither of these things
are possible any longer. And further, how the rule is to be applied
in error, it is difficult to understand. Is the court to reverse for
error in fact, or re-try upon new evidence, or are they confined to
the evidence submitted in the court below ?
These considerations, and they are but a few of the more obvious, may make it worth while to consider whether there has not
been some misunderstanding either of the rule or its application in
practice.
Now if it .be true that the proper mode of trying a question of
foreign law, that is, the fact, what is the rule of conduct in another
country upon a particular state of facts-is to read to a jury, codes,
statutes, or the reports of decided cases-certainly the common law,
which is generally thought to be eminently practical, has hero
fallen into a gross blunder. For can any thing be more absurd than
to throw upon men, incompetent to express an opinion on a question arising under the law of their own country, the decision of the
same question under that of another. But is this the proper way ?
Is it the form in which analogous cases are tried ? If a question
arises under the patent law, for instance, involving the results,
either of a refined mathematical. calculation or the law of chemical
affinities, has it been hitherto thought necessary to instruct the
jury in the elements of mathematical or chemical science ? or does
the occult nature of the fact authorize the judge to assume the province of the jury ? Do we not rather resort to the testimony or
opinions of experts on the exact point or question of fact in issue ?
Precisely so with foreign law, if our rule is but understood. And
infinitely greater is the necessity for this mode of dealing with the
question. For unlike laws of science, there is in regard to municipal law, a traditionary law or practice with which the readers ane
hearers are assumed to be familiar, and without which an attemr
practically to apply the commands of a statute or the directions
a judge, would most frequently lead to gross absurdity. It is almoF
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impossible fully to-appreciate the difficulty which arises out of this
element in dealing with a question of law not of the country in
which we live ; and besides a law of science is not liable to be repealed or overruled, which sometimes occurs in municipal law.
For such reasons as these, doubtless, it was that the English law
declared the existence of a rule of foreign law to belong to the province of the jury, because it must be proven by experts, speakingnot to the abstract question, nor assigning reasons for the rule, but
simply swearing to the existence of a rule, if there be one. Thus we
find in Cocks vs. _Purday, 2 0. & K. 269, that the expert must
state the law upon his responsibility, and should not be permitted to
read scraps of a code ; and in Baron De Bodes' case, 8 Q. B. 208,
the jurist was permitted to state the law of his country, though enacted in a code, without producing a copy. Thus reversing a rule
of evidence, universal, when the meaning of a writing is to be ascertained, because, the point was not what the code saidnor even what
it meant-but what was the rule of law which had been deduced by
the courts and community from that code. The language of Lord
Denman is: "Properly speaking, the nature of such evidence is not
to set forth the contents of the written law, but its effect, and the
state of the law resulting from it. The mere contents, indeed,
might often mislead persons not famitiar with the particularsystem of law. The witness is called upon to state what law does result from the instrument." Coleridge, J.'s remarks on pp. 265-6,
are not the less pointed and conclusive.
Surely this is not remarkable when we look at our own law.
What a figure a foreigner would present, to be sure, who would undertake to advise a course of action guided by our statutes, even when
aided by our reports. What foreigner could pretend to certainty
in not having overlooked some later statute or an unpublished decision. An instance or two, which accident has thrown in our way,
may illustrate the result of these attempts at universality.
Thus, for instance, no less a person than Geo. Jos. Bell, professor of the law of Scotland, in the University of Edinburgh, in his
Contract of Sale, p. 59, says, "on the proof of sale (of chattels) by
the law of America :" "1The law of the United States of America,
in this matter, is grounded on the law of England, and has, indeed,
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been settled nearly on a footing of the English statute of frauds as
applicable to all contracts for the sale of goods or chattels for the
price of $50 or more." "The statute of frauds as thus adopted
in America, has, a few years ago, been reconstructed by the legislature of New York, and the rules as so fixed, are proclaimed in the
revised statutes." Then laying down the rule as it formerly stood
under "the American statute of frauds," as settled by some decisions, the references to which are either misprinted or impossible,
probably meaning those of Maryland, he proceeds to show the
changes effected in the American statute by the revised American
statute.
Now, our ten fingers would scarce serve to count the blunders in
these two pages. So gross that a witness stating the law in this
wise would be convicted of perjury. Yet why should Pennsylvania
judges suppose that in examining questions of foreign law they are
more likely to be right than this learned professor ? Are they
better trained ? Have they better sources of information ? The
clear and elegant treatise of Kent has thus been honestly converted
into nonsense by an excellent and learned jurist, simply because he
assumed he knew what he was utterly ignorant of, the practicallaw
of another State.
Even in a case much nearer home, and where the court was exercising a jurisdiction which required them to administer our
law, and in which the decision was undoubtedly right, we see a judge
clearly of the opinion that every thing done in the Common Pleas
under an assignee's account, if that was filed voluntarily, is coram
non judice, Shelby vs. Bacon, 10 How. 68. It would be difficult to
find a Pennsylvania lawyer who could be brought to doubt whether
any distinction exists between such a case, and one commenced by
citation and attachment. Yet evidently the learned judge of the
Supreme Court of the United States, was entirely unaware both of
our rules of practice and procedure, and of the effect which attaches
to a proceeding upon which millions of property have depended.
No case can be stronger than occurred in Wildes vs. Savage, 1
Story, 22. The question was, whether a letter promising to accept
a particular bill of exchange, could be, by the law of England,
treated as an acceptance by a person to whom the letter was not ad-

